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Privacy law in the United States has not kept pace with the 
realities of technological development, nor the growing reliance 
on the Internet of Things (IoT). As of now, the law has not 
adequately secured the “smart” home from intrusion by the state, 
and the Supreme Court further eroded digital privacy by 
conflating the common law concepts of trespass and exclusion in 
United States v. Jones. This article argues that the Court must 
correct this misstep by explicitly recognizing the method by which 
the Founding Fathers sought to “secure” houses and effects 
under the Fourth Amendment. Namely, the Court must reject its 
overly narrow trespass approach in lieu of the more appropriate 
right to exclude. This will better account for twenty-first century 
surveillance capabilities and properly constrain the state.  
Moreover, an exclusion framework will bolster the reasonable 
expectation of digital privacy by presuming an objective 
unreasonableness in any warrantless penetration by the state into 
the smart home. 
INTRODUCTION 
During Apple’s Macworld keynote in January 2007, Steve Jobs 
unveiled “an iPod, a phone, and an Internet communicator,” promising: 
“This will change everything.”1  Indeed, as the paragon of so-called 
‘smart’ technology, the iPhone has changed entire industries, and in short 
order, introduced society at-large to an interconnected world.2  This 
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1 Lisa Eadicicco, Watch Steve Jobs Unveil the First iPhone 10 Years Ago Today, 
TIME (Jan. 9, 2017), http://time.com/4628515/steve-jobs-iphone-launch-keynote-
2007/. 
2 See SAMUEL GREENGARD, THE INTERNET OF THINGS xii (2016) (noting that the 
introduction of the iPhone on the market, and its impact on the market, was a 
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concept is increasingly – and quite literally – being brought home.3  
Network- and inter-connected devices, also referred to as the Internet of 
Things (“IoT”), are creating a “nervous system” within what is 
traditionally one of the most private of spaces: the home. Access “the 
house’s digital hub and you can actually spy on [its] chattering stuff.”4  
Privacy law in the United States has not adequately kept pace with 
these technological developments, and its failure to recognize the unique 
character of digital information is undermining the security of the home 
against government intrusion. With the rejuvenation of a trespass-based 
conception of the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Jones,5 the 
Supreme Court eroded digital privacy by relying on a legal concept better 
suited to the physical context.6  Such reliance leads to perverse results. For 
example, one district court judge equated the FBI gaining remote access 
to a private computer by exploiting digital vulnerabilities (i.e., hacking) to 
an officer peering through a gap in an apartment’s window blinds, and 
therefore not requiring a warrant.7 By relying on this inappropriate 
analogy, the judge sanctioned full, unrestricted access to the data stored 
on a private computer without any showing of probable cause. 
As of now, the legal landscape is not equipped to adequately 
protect against digital abuses by the state.  Though a majority of the sitting 
members of the Supreme Court has signaled a willingness to accommodate 
                                                     
“crystalizing event” in the development of smart objects); cf. Planet of the 
Phones, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
leaders/21645180-smartphone-ubiquitous-addictive-and-transformative-planet-
phones (noting that the “iPhone exemplifies the early 21st century’s defining 
technology,” its transformative power derived from its “size and connectivity”).  
3 See There’s No Place Like [a Connected] Home, MCKINSEY & CO., 
http://www.mckinsey.com/spContent/connected_homes/index.html (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2017) (demonstrating a thirty-one percent compound annual growth rate 
of connected homes from 2015 through 2017); see also Eric Griffith & Alex 
Colon, The Best Smart Home Devices of 2018, PC MAG (Dec. 1, 2017, 11:51 
AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2410889,00.asp. 
4 Bill Wasik, In the Programmable World, All Our Objects Will Act as One, 
WIRED (May 14, 2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/05/internet-of-
things-2/; see generally, e.g., Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing 
Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905 (2010) 
(detailing the “ideal of the inviolate home” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
as a sphere afforded particular constitutional protection).  
5 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (holding the attachment and subsequent use of a tracking 
device on a vehicle constitutes a trespassory interference with an “effect,” and is 
therefore a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
6 Id. at 404 (“It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The 
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining 
information.”). 
7 United States v. Matish, 193 F.Supp. 3d 585, 615 (E.D. Va. June 23, 2016). 
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technological evolution into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court 
has yet to correct its misstep in Jones.8  It must do so. 
 As noted in Part I of this paper, smart devices are prolific, and they 
create vulnerabilities in the security of the home.  This section presents the 
Court’s evolution on privacy protections from a property- to personhood-
based paradigm.  Thereafter, Part II clarifies that the Fourth Amendment 
has historically been linked to privacy rights as a means of articulating the 
security of, among other things, “houses . . .  and effects”9 from 
government intrusion.  Part II then argues that a privacy-protective 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment should be based on exclusion, 
rather than trespass.  Thus, this paper concludes that the Court must reject 
Jones’ overly-narrow trespass approach, problematic for the non-physical 
intrusion at issue with IoT, in lieu of the more appropriate right to exclude.  
An exclusion-based framework will better account for twenty-first century 
technological surveillance techniques.  Doing so will fulfill the guarantees 
of the Fourth Amendment and ensure that the government may not 
unreasonably intrude upon digital privacy. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Internet of Things Comes Home  
Many associate smart devices with objects like Amazon’s Echo, 
the speaker that connects users to its smart assistant, Alexa.10 Yet beyond 
this, smart objects in the home are vast and varied.  From the mundane to 
the extremely personal, from juicers to condoms,11 the market share for 
                                                     
8 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (writing for the Court, 
Chief Justice Roberts noted that the search of a smartphone, with its vast quantity 
of information, “bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical search 
considered” in prior Fourth Amendment cases); Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he same technological advances that have made 
possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect the Katz test by 
shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations.”); Jones, 565 U.S. at 419 
(Alito, J., concurring) (arguing for a review of reasonable expectations of privacy 
based on new surveillance capabilities, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Kagan).  
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
10 See Alexa Voice Service, AMAZON, https://developer.amazon.com/alexa-voice-
service (last visited Dec. 13, 2017); Dan Eavon, What is Alexa? It’s Amazon’s 
New Virtual Assistant, DIGITAL TRENDS (Sept. 7, 2017, 1:03 PM), 
https://www.digitaltrends.com/home/what-is-amazons-alexa-and-what-can-it-
do/. 
11 See Jeff Dunn, 17 Ridiculous ‘Smart’ Gadgets that Really Exist, BUS. INSIDER 
(Mar. 14, 2017, 1:44 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/weirdest-smart-
gadgets-internet-of-things-smart-home-2017-3/#hidrate-spark-2; Griffith & 
Colon, supra note 3.  
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smart objects is growing.12  To be sure, “connected devices are disrupting 
every nook of the home.”13  But what are the “things” in the IoT,14 and 
what vulnerabilities are created by their proliferation? 
Stated simply, IoT refers to a web of identifiable devices—the 
things—which are capable of automatically communicating data about the 
device to a system able to read and interpret that information.15  Sensors 
are embedded in otherwise “dumb” objects to sense the environment 
around them and communicate that information onward.16  Not all smart 
devices are connected to the Internet in the strictest sense, though they may 
use the same Internet Protocol; indeed, some “smart” objects are so 
categorized because they contain a simple sensor like a radio frequency 
identification (“RFID”) chip that “talks” to some central system.17 
                                                     
12 See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 3 (detailing the current market for smart-
devices objects, current obstacles, and potential for growth); see also Peter M. 
Lefkowitz, Making Sense of the Internet of Things, 59 BOS. B.J. 23, 23 (Fall 2015) 
(“[IoT] will have an annual economic impact of between $4 trillion and $11 
trillion by 2025.”). 
13 MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 3 (listing “home intelligence, energy efficiency, 
entertainment, wellness, access control, home safety, home comfort, daily tasks, 
[and] connectivity”). 
14 To succinctly articulate the privacy issues inherent with IoT devices, this 
paper’s scope is limited to smart objects inside the home.  Under the current 
doctrinal construction of the Fourth Amendment, the location of activity 
complicates the analysis.  See generally Overview of the Fourth Amendment, 45 
GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3 (2016).  For instance, more nuance is needed 
for devices that are carried by a person both inside and outside the home (i.e., 
FitBit) and for objects that are just as likely to be in a home as in a location where 
the presumption of privacy has been found to be reduced (i.e., smart televisions 
in schools). See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) 
(holding a diminished expectation of privacy in schools).  While the character of 
the data that is collected by such devices is similar in kind to that collected in the 
home—and is therefore also worthy of privacy protections argued for in this 
paper—for rhetorical clarity, the smart devices at issue here are limited to those 
found within a home. 
15 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth 
Amendment of Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805, 823–24 (2016) (“Some definitions 
of IoT would require a higher level of interoperability to qualify as being part of 
the IoT.”). 
16 Michael Chui, et al., The Internet of Things, MCKINSEY Q. (Mar. 2010), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/high-tech/our-insights/the-internet-of-
things. 
17 See id.; INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD, 
FED. TRADE COMM. 5 (Jan. 2015) [Hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT], 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-
staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-
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The point of all IoT devices, however, is to gather information: 
“[T]hese networks churn out huge volumes of data that flow to computers 
for analysis . . . . They become tools for understanding complexity and 
responding to it swiftly.”18  Fundamentally, the IoT is a system of 
gathering large quantities of information that amount to private 
surveillance of the user’s activities, preferences, and habits in the home.19  
This information is then “leveraged” to optimize the function of the given 
object.20  Though primitive smart objects were initially designed to 
improve manufacturing,21 today “these connected devices . . . collect, 
transmit, store, and potentially share vast amounts of [highly personal] 
consumer data.”22  This information is granular in detail and almost 
incomprehensibly large in quantity.23 
To the extent that “internet connectivity makes good objects 
great,” it appears that “a chip-centric mentality has taken over,” without 
necessarily accounting for the security of the home network.24  Not all 
smart objects are designed with the same level of intelligence, or with the 
                                                     
privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf (discussing the continued ambiguity in IoT’s 
definition); cf. Matt Burgess, What is the Internet of Things?, WIRED Explains, 
WIRED UK (Apr. 21, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/internet-of-things-
what-is-explained-iot (distinguishing from “simple sensors” to “smartphones and 
wearables”). 
18 Chui, et al., supra note 16; see Patrick McFadin, Internet of Things: Where Does 
the Data Go?, WIRED, https://www.wired.com/insights/2015/03/internet-things-
data-go/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2017).  
19 Ferguson, supra note 15, at 818–19; see Jamie Lee Williams, Privacy in the 
Age of the Internet of Things, 41 HUM. RTS. 14, 15 (2016) (quoting the head of 
regulatory affairs at Siemens Metering Systems, saying “we can infer how many 
people are in the house, what they do, whether they’re upstairs, downstairs, do 
you have a dog, when do you habitually get up, when did you get up this morning, 
when do you have a shower: masses of private data”). 
20 Daniel Burrus, The Internet of Things is Far Bigger than Anyone Realizes, 
WIRED, https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/11/the-internet-of-things-bigger/ 
(last visited Apr. 25, 2017). 
21 Robin Kester, Demystifying the Internet of Things: Industry Impact, 
Standardization Problems, and Legal Considerations, 8 ELON L. REV. 205, 206 
(2016). 
22 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 2. 
23 See Alex Wall, Privacy and the Internet of Things: Everything Around You is 
Collecting your Private Data, RADAR (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.radar 
first.com/blog/privacy-and-the-internet-of-things (“By 2020, the Internet of 
Things will comprise no less than 50 billion devices and 212 billion sensors, 
generating 44 zettabytes of information.  A zettabyte is 1021 bytes or 
1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000.”). 
24 Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, The Internet of Heirlooms and Disposable 
Things, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 581, 583 (2016).  
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long-term functionality of the device in mind; think, for instance, about 
the average lifespan of a refrigerator versus a shampoo bottle, both of 
which are now connected “things.”25  A smart device only functions as 
such so long as its software is up-to-date.26  On one hand, some of these 
devices may be used in the home well beyond the point where the 
manufacturer—now a service provider—continues to patch critical 
vulnerabilities.27  Conversely, some devices are designed to be quickly 
disposed of, so they are not serviced at all due to the limited capacity of 
the object’s bandwidth or RFID.28  Yet, all software is a potential access 
point, a vector through which the security of a network may be 
compromised.29   
 Left unchecked, smart objects potentially can be transformed into 
tools of invasive surveillance by the state.30  Malicious (i.e., black hat) 
hackers already have proven that IoT devices are prime targets for 
infiltration:31 anecdotal stories proliferate, with hackers yelling at children 
through digital baby monitors32 and experiments proving the 
“inevitability” of an unsecured toaster being breached once connected to 
                                                     
25 Id. at 586–87 (“Security researcher Brian Krebs notes that poorly configured 
default settings for IoT devices are a security nightmare.  This is particularly true 
for devices that are costly to change, like many disposable ad cheap IoT 
devices.”). 
26 Id. at 583–84 (noting that software can crash suddenly and needs updates and 
upgrades to maintain its connectivity).  
27 See id. at 588–89 (“The typical lifetime of software is around 2 years.  But the 
estimated lifetime of some objects now connected to the Internet is often around 
10 years.  Just think about how long coffee pots and refrigerators last.”). 
28 Id. at 586. 
29 See e.g., Nick Ismail, The Internet of Things: The security Crisis of 2018?, INFO. 
AGE (Jan. 22, 2018), http://www.information-age.com/internet-things-security-
crisis-123470475/  (“The influx of additional entry points… plus a current lack of 
security standards for IoT devices, means there is a gaping hole in the perimeter 
of any home… that has installed IoT devices.”); see also Hartzog & Selinger, 
supra note 24, at 588 (noting that “every new IoT connection brings new risks”). 
30 Swaroop Poudel, Internet of Things: Underlying Technologies, 
Interoperability, and Threats to Privacy and Security, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
997, 1013 (2016) (comparing the potential for invasive surveillance of private 
spheres via IoT to that of CCTV in public). 
31 Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What are White Hat, Gray Hat, and Black Hat 
Hackers?, WIRED (Apr. 13, 2016, 5:03 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/04/ 
hacker-lexicon-white-hat-gray-hat-black-hat-hackers (“Black hats are criminals.  
They use their prowess to find or develop software holes and attack methods.”). 
32 Kashmir Hill, The Half-Baked Security of Our ‘Internet of Things’, FORBES 
(May 27, 2014, 2:56 PM),  https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/05/27/ 
article-may-scare-you-away-from-internet-of-things/. 
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the Internet.33  Governments are undeniably able, and they in fact are 
engaged in hacking;34 indeed, Congress has made it easier for U.S. law 
enforcement to remotely access computing devices for investigatory 
purposes.35  Like the black hats above, law enforcement agencies are 
working to develop, and in some cases already possess, the capabilities to 
access not only traditional computing devices but also smart objects within 
the home.36  To wit, the depth and scope of knowledge available to the 
government, should it seek to gain access to the smart-home’s “nervous 
system,” is exactly the type of intrusion the Fourth Amendment was 
designed to secure against.37   
B. The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment declares inviolate “the right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”38  It protects 
against unreasonable government intrusions by establishing a certain right 
to privacy enforceable by the individual “as against the world.”39  Yet, the 
Amendment is not clear as to exactly how this is manifested.  Supreme 
Court jurisprudence on this point has vacillated between a purely property 
                                                     
33 Andrew McGill, The Inevitability of Being Hacked, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 28, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/we-built-a-fake-
web-toaster-and-it-was-hacked-in-an-hour/505571/. 
34 Eva Galperin, The Year in Government Hacking: 2016 in Review, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 26, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/12/year-
government-hacking. 
35 See FED. R. CIV. P. 41; Supreme Court Approves Change to Rule 41 Search and 
Seizure Warrants for Electronic Property, THE NAT’L SEC. L. BRIEF (Apr. 29, 
2016), http://nationalsecuritylawbrief.com/supreme-courts-approves-change-to-
rule-41-search-and-seizure-warrants-for-electronic-property/; Kate Tummarello, 
The Fight Over Government Hacking Continues, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 
6, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/12/fight-over-government-hack 
ing-continues; see also Devin M. Adams, The 2016 Amendments to Criminal Rule 
41: National Search Warrants to Seize Cyberspace, ‘Particularly’ Speaking, 51 
U. RICH. L. REV. 272 (2017) (arguing for the propriety of the 2016 Amendments 
to Rule 41). 
36 See Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed, WIKILEAKS, https://wiki 
leaks.org/ciav7p1/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017); see also David Choi, WikiLeaks 
Publishes More Secret CIA Tools After the US Threatens Criminal Charges, BUS. 
INSIDER (Apr. 21, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/wikileaks-cia-hacking-
tools-samsung-weeping-angel-2017-4 (detailing the “Weeping Angel” tool that 
activates Samsung televisions’ built-in microphones for surveillance purposes). 
37 See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 820 (explaining that a “data-rich environment 
creates a wider mosaic of life patterns,” allowing police to virtually and constantly 
surveil).  
38 U.S. CONST. amend IV.  
39 See id.; Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 213. (Dec. 15, 1890). 
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(in rem) conception,40 to one based on expectations of privacy (in 
personam),41 to a hybrid of the two.42  As a result, the current Fourth 
Amendment framework imperils the security of digital information 
emanating from the home; it fails to accommodate the scope of the right 
the framers intended to protect and ignores how they sought to do so.  
The Amendment does not protect privacy as such.  Rather, it 
identifies and guarantees enumerated property interests, thus buttressing a 
sphere within which the intimacies of life may be protected.43  Until the 
mid-twentieth century, property law dominated the Court’s jurisprudence 
and increasingly obscured the underlying privacy interest.44  For instance, 
the Court’s 1886 decision in Boyd v. United States45 solidified the 
subordinate relationship of privacy to property, where intrusion upon the 
latter established the harm to the former.  “Every invasion of private 
property,” the Boyd Court declared, “be it ever so minute, is a trespass.”46  
Boyd subsumed privacy under the harm to property, thus triggering a 
constitutionally protected interest.47  The Boyd Court was also at pains to 
point out that “the eye cannot by the [common law] be guilty of a 
                                                     
40 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 493 (1928) (holding search and 
seizure are dependent upon physical interference with tangible effects). 
41 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A] 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy,” particularly in the home, and “the 
invasion of a constitutionally protected area by federal authorities is . . . 
presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant”); see also Kyllo 
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (reaffirming the reasonable expectation 
of privacy as the basis of Fourth Amendment protections).   
42 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2011) (reasserting trespass as a 
controlling factor in defining an unreasonable search, separate and complimentary 
to the Katz-based reasonable expectation of privacy). 
43 See Ricardo J. Bascuas, Property and Probable Cause: The Fourth 
Amendment’s Principled Protection of Privacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 575, 622–
23 (2008) (labeling “privacy” as the underlying interest protected through the 
security of property); see also William Clark, Note, Protecting the Privacies of 
Digital Life: Riley v. California, The Fourth Amendment’s Particularity 
Requirement, and Search Protocols for Cell Phone Search Warrants, 56 B.C. L. 
REV. 1981, 1988 (2015) (quoting Boyd, and detailing “privacies” as the intimate 
details of a person’s life). 
44 See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, 
Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 312 (1998) (starting from 
the late eighteenth century, with Boyd, through the latter half of the twentieth 
century “the Supreme Court defined the interest secured by the Fourth 
Amendment largely in terms of property rights”).  
45 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
46 Id. at 627. 
47 See id. at 628 (noting that a violation of the “secret nature of [private papers] 
will be an aggravation of the trespass”). 
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trespass.”48  Pursuant to this theory, observation alone is insufficient; 
rather, some physical interference with the property named in the 
Amendment is necessary before privacy may be infringed. 
This fealty to property is increasingly at odds with individual 
privacy as society develops its technological savvy.  One of the earliest 
instances of this growing disconnect came in 1928, when the Court 
decided Olmstead v. United States.49  That case concerned the 
admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless wiretap, 
which in turn proved a criminal bootleg conspiracy.50  The Olmstead Court 
focused on where the wiretapping occurred, noting that it was done 
“without trespass upon any property of the defendants” since the wires 
were physically located in public spaces.51  As such, the Court concluded 
that law enforcement’s eavesdropping on telecommunications did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment because no property interest was 
infringed.52  Consequently, the Court failed to protect the privacy of 
information that originated, at least partially, from within the home, an 
otherwise protected space within the plain text of the Fourth Amendment.  
The Court had difficulty identifying any privacy right separate from the 
tangible objects listed in the Amendment.53 It rejected outright the notion 
that protection could extend to “telephone wires, reaching to the whole 
world,” since they were not within any defendant’s house or otherwise 
directly associated with their private property.54   
With Silverman v. United States,55 decided in 1961, the Court 
declined to revisit its Olmstead logic to account for technological 
advancements in the intervening years.  There, when confronted with the 
use of a “spike mike,” the Court declined to go beyond the trespass 
analysis.56  Ignoring any conception of privacy separate from an invasion 
of property, the Court declared “a fair reading of the record in this case 
shows that the eavesdropping was accomplished by means of an 
unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by the 
                                                     
48 Id. at 628. 
49 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
50 Id. at 455. 
51 Id. at 457. 
52 Id. at 466 (“We think, therefore, that the wire tapping here disclosed did not 
amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
53 Id. at 464 (“The amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material 
things.”). 
54 Id. at 465. 
55 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
56 Id. at 506 (clarifying that “[t]he instrument in question was a microphone with 
a spike about a foot long attached to it,” which was inserted through a vacant room 
into an adjoining row house where it made contact with heating duct that 
amplified the mic’s capabilities). 
287 THESE WALLS CAN TALK [Vol. 16 
petitioners.”57  While the Court found that Silverman’s rights had been 
violated, it did so based on the state’s intrusion into the building’s heating 
duct, not on any notion of personal privacy owed to Silverman, distinct 
from his property interest.58 
This trespass-dependent equation broke down completely in 1967 
as the Court shifted from an in rem, property-based right to an in 
personam, privacy-based paradigm.59  In Katz v. United States,60 the Court 
found that the Fourth Amendment’s protections “cannot turn upon the 
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”61  
For the first time, the Court rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment 
was limited to “a given ‘area,’ viewed in the abstract, [as] ‘constitutionally 
protected.’”62  Rather, the rights ensured by the Amendment vest in 
“people, not places.”63  While the Court’s in personam reasoning was a 
monumental shift, the enduring legacy of Katz comes from Justice 
Harlan’s famous concurrence.  Following Katz, Fourth Amendment 
privacy protections are based upon reasonableness: where a subjective 
expectation of privacy exhibited by the individual is found objectively 
reasonable by society.64   
Notably, the Court did not reject the notion that particular 
locations are secured as such, by virtue of their character.65  Rather, it 
uncoupled trespass as a pre-requisite to privacy intrusions, allowing the 
right to vest directly in the individual.66  Certain areas are still very much 
at the fore of the Court’s thinking when evaluating constitutional 
                                                     
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 509 (“Eavesdropping accomplished by means of such a physical intrusion 
is beyond the pale.”). 
59 Jace C. Gatewood, The Evolution of the Right to Exclude – More than a 
Property Right, a Privacy Right, 32 MISS. C. L. REV. 447, 457–58 (2014). 
60 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
61 Id. at 353. 
62 Id. at 352. 
63 Id. 
64 See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding a twofold requirement to 
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy); see also United States v. Jones, 
565 U.S. 400, 408 (2012) (reaffirming the expectation of privacy standard); Kyllo 
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 44 (2001) (basing its analysis upon the two-part 
reasonableness standard). 
65 See, e.g., Oliver v. United States 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984) (quoting Hester v. 
United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (“[The] Amendment indicates with some 
precision the places and things encompassed by its protections. . . .  ‘The 
distinction between [open fields] and the house is as old as the common law.’”). 
66 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (noting that to read the Fourth Amendment 
exclusively through the lens of a property-based right “is to ignore the vital role” 
that pervasive technologies play in modern life). 
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protection—the home being chief among them, as an expressly protected 
object under the Amendment.67  
Following Katz, the Fourth Amendment secures two aspects of 
privacy, in equal measure. First, in personam, reasonable expectations of 
privacy are protected. Second, certain locales are singled out for specific 
protection.  The Court, however, continues to grapple with the issue of 
technological invasions of the home.68  In deciding these cases, the Court 
has relied both on the constitutional sanctity of the home and on 
expectations of privacy, but it has yet to properly balance digital privacy 
interests.    
In Kyllo v. United States,69 in 2001, the Court addressed “[the] 
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”70  The 
case concerned the warrantless use of thermal imaging of Danny Lee 
Kyllo’s home by law enforcement agents, who deployed a heat-sensing 
device to detect the presence of high-intensity lamps for growing 
marijuana indoors.71  The scan, conducted from across the street, identified 
a single room that was relatively hotter, thus tending to prove the presence 
of such lamps.72  In 1992, when the scan was completed, mobile thermal 
technology of the kind used against the Kyllo residence was not in 
widespread use, which factored heavily in the decision by the Court.73  
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia declared that “obtaining by sense-
enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home 
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion 
into a constitutionally protected area constitutes a search—at least where  
. . . the technology in question is not in general public use.”74  The Kyllo 
Court was keen to maintain flexibility in its interpretation of the Fourth 
                                                     
67 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting houses directly); see also Stern, supra 
note 4, at 913 (“In a jurisprudence focused on privacy versus publicity, the home 
is the quintessential private space.”). 
68 Cf. Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment 
Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527 
(2017) (surveying privacy jurisprudence relating to electronic surveillance in 
public, with reflections of the law relating to the home). 
69 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
70 Id. at 34 (addressing how much technological enhancement is too much to 
survive constitutional scrutiny). 
71 Id. at 30. 
72 Id. 
73 See id. at 30, 40. 
74 Id. at 34 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
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Amendment to preserve protection against “technology that could discern 
all human activity in the home.”75   
In 2012, however, by declaring that trespass was again 
determinative in United States v. Jones, the Court upended the trajectory 
of its Fourth Amendment decisions, which theretofore had progressed 
towards a more digital privacy-protective framework.76  In doing so, it 
introduced a hybrid in rem/in personam interpretation of the Amendment.  
Jones concerned the pervasive surveillance of a vehicle—an “effect” 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment77—through the attachment 
of a GPS tracker without a valid warrant.78  Despite the Court’s exclusive 
reliance on expectations of privacy since Katz in 1967, Justice Scalia, 
again writing for the majority, reiterated that the Court’s privacy 
jurisprudence “embod[ies] a particular concern for government 
trespass.”79  He reasoned that, at a minimum, the Amendment’s guarantee 
against unreasonable searches must replicate “the degree of protection it 
afforded when it was adopted.”80  Thus, he found that law enforcement 
had trespassed against Jones’ constitutionally protected “effect;” as such, 
no further privacy analysis was necessary.81  As a result, per Justice Alito’s 
concurrence, the majority opinion relies on “18th-century tort law” to 
address a “21st-century surveillance technique.”82  The Court assures, 
however, that had no interference with property occurred, the reasonable 
expectation of privacy would control.83 
By re-animating trespass as a legitimate basis for Fourth 
Amendment protections, the Jones Court recalled into existence the 
historic requirement for “a physical intrusion . . . by the government on 
property belonging to another,”84 as in the Boyd-Olmstead-Silverman line 
                                                     
75 Id. at 35–36 (indicating in dicta that such surveillance may have constitutional 
implications). 
76 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“Jones’ Fourth 
Amendment Rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”). 
77  See Oliver v. United States 466 U.S. 170, 177 n.7 (1984) (noting that the 
framers would label personal, rather than real property as an “effect”); Ferguson, 
supra note 15, at 828 (noting “effects” within the meaning of the amendment 
generally refers to goods, moveable objects, or possessions: an individual’s 
personal property). 
78 Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (defining a vehicle as a Fourth Amendment effect, and 
the attachment thereto of a GPS tracking device to be a trespassory search).  
79 Id. at 406. 
80 Id. at 411. 
81 Id. at 412–13. 
82 Id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring). 
83 Id. at 411 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals 
without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”) (emphasis removed). 
84 Gatewood, supra note 59, at 454.  
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of cases.  Indeed, trespass at common law has a specific meaning: as 
narrowly defined by Sir William Blackstone, trespass “signifie[d] no more 
than an entry on another man’s ground without a lawful authority, and 
doing some damage, however inconsiderable.”85  In turning to this 
particular conception of property rights at common law, the Jones Court 
side-stepped another central property right, arguably the sine qua non: the 
right to exclude.86  Per Blackstone, property is “that sole and despotic 
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of 
the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the 
universe.”87  
 Indeed, Jones leaves open several lingering questions about how 
the Fourth Amendment protects and secures digital privacy in the age of 
the IoT.  The Court’s evolution from its exclusive dependence in Boyd, 
Olmstead, and Silverman on in rem, and specifically trespassory, harm, 
gave way to a right vested directly in the person.88  The reasonable 
expectation of privacy recognized for the first time the tangible and 
intangible aspects of the privacy right secured by the Fourth Amendment, 
by vesting in personam.  Katz therefore distinguished the personhood and 
property form of the right, while continuing to recognize certain specific 
locations whose protection remains heightened.89  Kyllo is a prime 
example where the in rem right yielded to the in personam, with the Court 
finding it unreasonable to expect certain surveillance technologies being 
deployed against a home.90  Kyllo left open the question of reasonable 
expectations regarding commonly used technologies,91 but Jones radically 
altered the trajectory of the Court’s jurisprudence by recalling into force 
the trespass analysis—abandoned a half-century before—as the 
controlling framework.92  This last turn in the Court’s jurisprudence leaves 
digital privacy open to abuse by the state, where strict interpretations of 
                                                     
85 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 3, at 209 
(photo. Reprint, Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1766). 
86 See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 
730, 730 (1998) (explaining the logical and historical primacy of the right to 
exclude in property law). 
87 Id. at 734 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 2, at 2 (photo. Reprint, Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1766). 
88 See Gatewood, supra note 59 at 457–58 (discussing the evolution from a 
property-based to a privacy-based paradigm). 
89 Id. at 461. 
90 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 34 (2001). 
91 Cf. id. (basing its holding on the lack of common usage). 
92 See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 832 (concluding that, among other things, Jones 
resurrected the “long-dormant” trespass theory of the amendment). 
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property rights overwhelm reasonable expectations of privacy, or where 
courts are unwilling to find an objective expectation of reasonableness.93 
 II. ANALYSIS 
New technologies fundamentally alter society.94  Still, the 
durability of constitutional protections depends upon the law 
accommodating how people interact with these new technologies and how 
law enforcement may legitimately utilize the benefits of technological 
development.95  The essence of the Fourth Amendment, however, is to 
restrain unwarranted government action against the individual: it is the 
expression of the framers’ intent to secure the American people from 
intrusion by the state, in the form of unreasonable search and seizure.96  
Without a proper recognition by the Court of how the Fourth Amendment 
protects digital privacy, virtual access by law enforcement threatens the 
security of citizens in their houses and digital effects.97  Thus, to ensure 
privacy in the face of  evolving technology, it is once again “necessary        
. . . to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection.”98 
  In a world dominated by smart devices, the right to exclude—not 
trespass—is the better analytical framework.  As clarified below, the use 
of property rights by the framers was not so literal; it was a method of 
articulating privacy rights “secured” under the Fourth Amendment. 
Indeed, the state is precluded from exploiting digital vulnerabilities in the 
home unless it overcomes the burdens imposed on it by the Fourth 
Amendment to prove reasonableness.99  Yet, the analysis (re)instituted by 
Jones in 2012 does not adequately account for the data-rich environment 
created by smart devices in the home, or the wide-ranging surveillance 
                                                     
93 Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 414, 425–26 (2012) (Sotomayor and Alito, 
JJ., concurring) (noting lingering issues unaddressed by the purely trespass theory 
of the majority). 
94 See, e.g., Jim Luce, The Impact of Cell Phones on Psychology, Community, 
Culture, Arts and Economics, Huffington Post (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jim-luce/the-impact-of-cell-
phones_b_508011.html (discussing smart phones’ impact on the quality of 
people’s lives). 
95 Cf. Gatewood, supra note 59, at 457–58 (recognizing action by the Court in 
response to developing technologies to ensure proper privacy protections in its 
adoption of the Katz standard). 
96 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914). 
97 See U.S. Const. amend IV; Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of Privacy as the 
Central Value Protected by the Fourth Amendment’s Prohibition on 
Unreasonable Searches, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 143, 161 (2015). 
98 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 39, at 193. 
99 See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 822 
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opportunities they afford to law enforcement.100  Rather, the Court should 
build on its decision in Kyllo to strengthen the in personam expectation of 
privacy by making explicit its reliance on exclusion as a means of 
perfecting the Fourth Amendment’s “security.”101  Doing so will properly 
constrain the state’s ability to gain access to the digital home. 
A. The Fourth Amendment is a Means of “Securing” Privacy 
The founding fathers were pragmatic in their use of property rights 
at common law to express the scope of the Fourth Amendment, but their 
intent to protect a right to privacy vested in the person is clear by the term 
used to conserve such rights: namely, to “secure.”  In crafting the Fourth 
Amendment, the framers were determined to guarantee safeguards that 
would prohibit “invasions of the home and [thereby, to secure] privacy of 
the citizens.”102  In essence, resistance to unreasonable search and seizure 
was the codification of the maxim: “a man’s house [is] his castle . . . not 
to be invaded by any general authority.”103  Thus, the Amendment’s 
drafters sought to protect “the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies 
of life” through property law as a means of guaranteeing that sphere of 
protection.104 
Property law is “deployed as a means of operationalizing privacy, 
not replacing it.”105 The enumeration of certain tangible objects—persons, 
houses, papers, and effects—was meant to cover the breadth of personal 
interests guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.106  Rather than elevate 
tortious trespass by the government to the level of constitutional 
protection, these property rights articulate the scope of the privacy right.107 
As such, these objects represent the sphere within which “the privacies of 
life” are protected. 
                                                     
100 See id. at 818–19; see also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (presenting the “mosaic theory” whereby largescale, aggregated data 
reveals the intimacies of life). 
101 See section II.c infra (arguing for the replacement of trespass with exclusion 
as a means of establishing a reasonable expectation of digital privacy). 
102 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389–390 (1914); see Clancy, supra note 
44 at 310. 
103 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390. 
104 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 603 (referencing Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State 
Trials 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765) as evidence of the founding fathers’ 
purpose in crafting the Fourth Amendment). 
105 Slobogin, supra note 97, at 156. 
106 Id.; see also Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
107 See Bascuas, supra note 43, at 622. 
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Thus, property is the means to explain the scope of the 
constitutional privacy right,108 and security is the action effectuating the 
Fourth Amendment’s purpose.109  Indeed, the Fourth Amendment speaks 
explicitly of a right to be “secure” in the enumerated property interests.110  
For the framers, “security” from unreasonable intrusion referred to the 
right to exclude; to wit, it is the essential attribute of the action guaranteed 
by the Amendment.111  “Without the ability to exclude, a person has no 
security.  With the ability to exclude, a person has all the Fourth 
Amendment promises: protection against unjustified intrusions by the 
government.”112   
This right to exclude extends to all private property, both real and 
personal, guaranteed through the Fourth Amendment’s enumeration of 
tangible objects—the text of the Amendment does not draw hierarchies 
between houses and effects.  As Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis noted 
in their seminal work on the right to privacy, “the term ‘property’ has 
grown to comprise every form of possession—intangible, as well as 
tangible.”113  As such, the ability to exclude proscribes all unreasonable 
intrusion by the state, tangible and intangible.114 
 The right to exclude is fundamental to property at common law—
related, but distinct from the narrower trespass.115  The Fourth Amendment 
is not concerned with tortious trespass, as Justice Scalia’s opinion in Jones 
asserts.  Rather, the Amendment excludes the government from specific 
objects as a means of articulating the breadth of a constitutional right to 
privacy.  This distinction is necessary in a modern context where virtual 
intrusion by law enforcement threatens the security of the smart home.  
“Security” through exclusion guarantees the inviolability of both the 
tangible and intangible effects protected by the Fourth Amendment and 
therefore is the most appropriate framework given the advent of IoT.116  
 
 
                                                     
108 Id. at 622–23 (“‘Property’ for Fourth Amendment purposes needs to be 
interpreted to further the underlying purpose of protecting privacy.”). 
109 See generally, Clancy, supra note 44 (articulating security as the function of 
the Fourth Amendment).  
110 See U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Ferguson, supra note 15, at 861. 
111 See Clancy, supra note 44, at 308. 
112 Id. at 308–09. 
113 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 39, at 193.  
114 See Clancy, supra note 44, at 367–68 (“That was the essential lesson of Katz.”). 
115 Gatewood, supra note 59, at 452. 
116 See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 861 (indicating that “security” is the best 
framework towards the protection of digital effects).  
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B. Reliance on Trespass is Inappropriate in a “Smart” World 
The concern expressed by the Court in Kyllo persists: technology 
threatens to shrink the realm of privacy protections, now because of 
ambiguity in the law regarding smart objects.117  Yet, the Fourth 
Amendment must protect at least the scope of rights it guaranteed at its 
passage: namely, security of privacy interests.118  Justice Scalia’s pivot 
back to trespass in Jones presents a problematic and overly restrictive 
conception of the Amendment.  As it has historically, property plays a 
constructive role as a means of articulating what is secured by the Fourth 
Amendment.119  Yet, Jones’ literalism misconstrues the method by which 
the framers sought to guarantee the underlying privacy right.120  The turn 
to trespass by the Jones Court is too dependent upon the physical to 
survive modern dependence on smart technologies, and it fails to properly 
account for the framers’ methodology to guarantee the “[digital] privacies 
of [twenty-first century] life.”121  
In his majority opinion in Jones, Justice Scalia acknowledges the 
“close connection to property” reflected in the text of the Fourth 
Amendment.122  Privacy jurisprudence, he was careful to reiterate, was tied 
to property at common law until Katz.123  Yet, “the Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the 
common-law trespassory test.”124  Thus, Justice Scalia concluded that the 
corpus of Fourth Amendment law post-Katz remains linked to trespass, 
though not exclusively, as with the purely in-rem decisions of the Court 
prior to 1967.125 
 The glaring issue with Justice Scalia’s recalling of trespass to the 
fore of privacy law is its false equivalence between exclusion and trespass.  
                                                     
117 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (noting the limitation on hits finding of 
unreasonableness). 
118 Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34). 
119 Carrie Leonetti, A Grand Compromise for the Fourth Amendment, 12 J. BUS. 
& TECH. L. 1, 21 (2016) (“A new doctrine of Fourth Amendment property could 
serve as a unifying principle to rationalize and expand the Amendment’s privacy 
protections.”). 
120 See Bascuas, supra note 43, at 622–23 (creating a property interest is “the law’s 
vehicle for recognizing and affording privacy” as a pragmatic approach towards 
guaranteeing its protection).  
121 See Leonetti, supra note 119, at 21 (2016) (“High-tech invasions of privacy 
inflict serious harms that demand a more appropriate legal remedy than 
[reasonableness].”). 
122 Jones, 565 U.S. at 405. 
123 Id. at 405–06. 
124 Id. at 409 (emphasis in original). 
125 Id. at 405–06. 
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For American colonialists, security in possessions was exclusive; but at 
that time, the distinction between exclusion and trespass—defined by a 
physical presence on, or in relation to, the property of another—was less 
clear.126  The Supreme Court did not begin to tease out the distinction 
between an incursion on the effect and the information that it generated 
until Katz and its progeny;127 indeed, the clearest analysis was not 
announced until 2014.128  The physicality of trespass at the time of the 
Fourth Amendment’s passage was not the problematic distinction it is in 
the modern context, since exclusion from an effect had no functional, 
intangible application.129  Yet, just as the Boyd-Olmstead-Silverman line 
increasingly demonstrated that a privacy right at the mercy of trespass is 
vulnerable in the age of wired telecommunications, so too does the Jones 
physicality requirement enfeeble privacy in the age of IoT. 
C. Exclusion Promotes an Objective Expectation of Digital Privacy 
Jones’ reliance on common law trespass is too restrictive to 
appropriately protect privacy interests in a digital age.130  Cyberspace, of 
course, is not a “space” in the physical sense; it is an electronic conduit 
through which physical consequences may be generated.131  Likewise, 
even the least intelligent, RFID-enabled smart object in the home offers “a 
direct portal into the data it contains, a point of ‘entry’ [law enforcement] 
can exploit without affecting any physical entry into Fourth Amendment-
protected premises.”132  Under Justice Scalia’s formulation, the Court “left 
open whether virtual intrusions” of smart objects “will also constitute a 
search.”133 The Court must correct its course, recognize the inapt nature of 
                                                     
126 See Clancy, supra note 44, at 356. 
127 See Gatewood, supra note 59, at 457–58 (discussing the Court’s motivation 
with Katz to address the distinction between physical and personal privacy). 
128 See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 833 (commenting on the novel analytical move 
in Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), distinguishing “physical objects 
from digital content (data) in those physical objects”). 
129 See cf. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (cautioning the 
Court against its reliance on trespass, as “ways may some day be developed by 
which the government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can 
reproduce them in court, [exposing] the most intimate occurrences of the home”). 
130 See infra section III.b (arguing that smart objects in the home are effects within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and constitutional protection for smart 
effects extends to the data they generate, store, and communicate). 
131 Susan W. Brenner, Fourth Amendment Future: Remote Computer Searches 
and the Use of Virtual Force, 81 MISS. L.J. 1229, 1230 (2012). 
132 Id. at 1241–42. 
133 Ferguson, supra note 15, at 810; see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414, 
425–26 (2012) (Sotomayor and Alito, JJ., concurring) (agreeing that Jones’ 
reliance on common law trespass is too restrictive to appropriately protect digital 
privacy interests). 
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physical trespass for smart objects, and set an objective expectation of 
privacy based on a right to exclude. 
To be sure, the Jones Court punted on the broader discussion of 
the constitutional propriety of invasive electronic surveillance, and it 
failed to engage in any explanation of the character of the data gathered—
namely, whether it reveals enough about the “privacies of life” that 
collection by law enforcement of such information would, in itself, trigger 
the Fourth Amendment.134  In his concurrence, Justice Alito comes closest 
to clarifying this more pertinent issue, which the majority opinion 
dismisses as beyond the scope of the matter.135  Justice Alito rightly points 
out that “reliance on the law of trespass will present particularly vexing 
problems in cases involving surveillance . . . carried out by making 
electronic, as opposed to physical, contact with the item to be tracked.”136  
Justice Sotomayor echoed Justice Alito’s concern, noting that “physical 
intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance.”137  She went 
further, though, to question broader societal expectations of privacy, 
ignored by the majority, that may be impacted by advancing technological 
capabilities and electronic surveillance.138  Most conspicuously, though 
outside the scope of this paper, she questioned the longevity in the digital 
age of the Third Party Doctrine,139 which holds individuals have no 
expectation of privacy regarding information disclosed to third parties, 
notably, to service providers.140   
Articulating a reasonable expectation of privacy grounded in the 
right to exclude will bring into the sphere of the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection smart devices that otherwise pose risks to the security of the 
home and the effects it contains. In line with Justices Alito and 
Sotomayor’s concerns, the right to exclude, rather than trespass, is better 
suited to the non-physical technological capabilities of twenty-first 
century surveillance.  The two concepts, both grounded in common law 
                                                     
134 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 412 (acknowledging that these “vexing problems” may 
need to be addressed in the future “where a classic trespassory search is not 
involved”); see also Ferguson, supra note 15, at 810 (agreeing that the Court left 
open the question of whether “virtual intrusions will also constitute a search”). 
135 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 425–26 (Alito, J., concurring) (enumerating four broad 
concerns left unanswered by the majority opinion). 
136 Id. at 426. 
137 Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
138 See id. at 416 (considering the “attributes of GPS monitoring” vis-à-vis societal 
expectations). 
139 Id. at 417 (“It may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to 
third parties.”). 
140 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 
U.S. 435 (1976). 
297 THESE WALLS CAN TALK [Vol. 16 
property, are related but distinct, with trespass predicated on the broader 
notion of exclusion.141  Unique among property rights at common law, the 
right to exclude encompasses societal norms and expectations of privacy 
as well as offers an objective “benchmark for determining the scope of 
allowable intrusion into our daily lives.”142  Thus, exclusion preserves 
personal autonomy and protects against arbitrary intrusions by the state.143 
Jones did not reject Justice Harlan’s expectations of privacy.  Per 
the majority opinion, where no trespassory intrusion is executed by the 
state, the Katz analysis controls.144  What is reasonable in the context of 
IoT, however, is far from clear.  The Court’s decision in Kyllo gives some 
indication as to how a privacy right may be articulated with regards to 
smart objects in the home; but there, too, questions remain.145  In contrast 
to Jones, Kyllo  did not involve a trespass.146  The thermal scan of the home 
occurred from across the street and was purely electronic.147  In Kyllo, the 
right to exclude was tacitly supported by the Court as a corollary to the 
reasonable expectation of privacy.148  Importantly though, Kyllo also 
stands for the notion that widely available technologies, or those in 
common use, may diminish expectations of privacy.149  How this would 
play out in the context of smart objects is unclear where it is broadly 
understood that government agents, if not also black hat hackers, are able 
to remotely access smart devices in the home.150     
 Correcting its misstep in Jones, however, would go a long way 
towards correcting this uncertainty.  In doing so, the Court should build on 
its decision in Kyllo and affirmatively rely on the right to exclude, while 
expressly recognizing the ubiquity of modern smart technology.  Such a 
holding will have the added benefit of articulating the method by which 
                                                     
141 See Gatewood, supra note 59, at 454. 
142 Id. at 464–65. 
143 See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 862 (“Whether conceived of as a right to be 
left alone, or a space for intimate activities, or other protections of personal 
autonomy, the Fourth Amendment has been read to encourage human 
development from governmental surveillance.”).   
144 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 
145 See Gatewood, supra note 59, at 461. 
146 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 30 (2001) (noting the thermal scan 
was conducted from across the street, outside the curtilage). 
147 Id. 
148 Gatewood, supra note 59, at 461 (noting the reasonable expectation of privacy 
“preserv[ed] and protect[ed] the defendant’s right to exclude even without a 
physical intrusion”). 
149 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
150 See supra notes 35–37 (detailing the known hacking capabilities of state and 
private actors to remotely access networked devices). 
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the framers intended to secure privacy.151  Moreover, an exclusion 
framework, which inherently incorporates notions of reasonable 
expectations of privacy, would help to further assimilate digital privacy 
security under Katz by presuming exclusion as objectively reasonable.152  
This would help to focus the Kyllo analysis onto enhanced technologies, 
rather than turning on common usage—a point Justice Scalia was 
uncertain about in his Kyllo majority.153  Thus, the pathway to a digital-
privacy-protective Fourth Amendment in houses and effects would be 
more secure through the explicit recognition of the right to exclude. 
CONCLUSION  
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is again at a junction where 
relatively new, but pervasive, technologies demand a course-correction.  
The business model of smart devices amounts to private surveillance, and 
society has accepted this to the extent that it improves services through 
interconnectivity.154  Yet, these devices have a range of intelligence, and 
each smart object represents a vector for remote access by black hat 
hackers and government agents alike.155 Without an affirmative 
recognition by the Court that the data-rich smart home is secured by the 
Fourth Amendment, privacy rights in the United States are vulnerable to 
digital abuses by the state.  
 As the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests, 
the privacy standard guaranteed by the Amendment must focus on 
unlawful intrusion, not the mechanism by which the intrusion is or may be 
perfected.156  The method of this protection has evolved from an in rem 
focus on trespass, to the in personam reasonable expectation of privacy, 
and back to a hybrid approach defined by the physicality of the intrusion.  
The trespass approach re-instituted in Jones, however, fails to account for 
the potentially remote nature of government incursions at issue with the 
IoT and consequently, “is ill-suited to the digital age.”157  The Fourth 
                                                     
151 See Clancy, supra note 44, at 308 (linking security to the right to exclude as 
the means of operationalizing privacy). 
152 See Leonetti, supra note 119, at 21 (arguing that the serious harms inflicted by 
high-tech invasions of privacy may best be corrected by a property-based doctrine 
that “serve[s] as a unifying principle to rationalize and expand the Amendment’s 
privacy protections,” like that provided by a reliance on exclusion). 
153 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
154 Cf. Bruce Schneier, The Internet of Things that Talk About You Behind Your 
Back, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 8, 2016), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ 
the-internet-of-things-that-talk-about-you-behind-your-back (discussing 
computerized devices and cyber security). 
155 Hartzog & Selinger, supra note 24, at 583–84. 
156 See Slobogin, supra note 97, at 162. 
157 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
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Amendment uses the language and concepts of property law to articulate 
the scope of the right protected, and it secures that right to privacy through 
exclusion from certain enumerated objects.  The Court, therefore, must 
reject the overly-narrow approach of Jones in favor of a right to exclude 
that better accounts for the digital capabilities of twenty-first century 
surveillance.  Moreover, doing so will have the added benefit of bolstering 
the reasonable expectation of digital privacy by presuming an objective 
unreasonableness in any warrantless penetration by the state into the smart 
home.  Digital privacy is ripe for the Court’s attention, and the Court 
should use this opportunity to “define anew . . . the extent of such 
protection” guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment in the age of the IoT.158 
                                                     
158 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 39, at 193.  
